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ISLAM, THE STATE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT IN INDONESIA 
Simon Butt† 
Abstract: Indonesia is home to more Muslims than any other country. Yet it is 
not an Islamic state and is unlikely to become one, despite the strong and sustained 
urgings of some Muslim groups.  Indonesian Islam is, like Indonesian society itself, 
dynamic and diverse, accommodating a wide variety of practices and beliefs.  One area of 
contention between conservative Muslims on the one hand, and the state (supported by 
many more moderate Muslims) on the other, is the extent to which Islamic law should be 
recognised, applied and enforced by institutions of state.  The Indonesian government's 
response has generally been to limit formal recognition of Islamic law to specified areas 
of family law and finance, codifying the relevant principles and enforcing them through 
Islamic courts.  This article considers whether the constitutional freedom of religion, 
introduced in 2000, requires the state to provide mechanisms to apply and enforce the 
corpus of Islamic law.  In particular, it discusses two cases in which Muslims asked the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court to consider whether freedom of religion required the 
state to remove restrictions on polygamy, and to allow Indonesia's Religious Courts to 
apply Islamic law in its entirety, including criminal law. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country in the 
world.  Of its approximately 210 million people, around eighty-eight percent 
call themselves Muslims.1  Yet, the proper place for Islam within the 
Indonesian legal and political systems is an issue of continuing debate and 
contest.  Muslim groups have, since colonial times, regularly and vocally 
pushed for a greater political and legal role for Islam.2  But the state—both 
colonial and independent—has resisted many of their demands, thereby 
remaining, for the most part, the primary source of legal and social 
meanings.3  
                                           
†
 The author thanks the law faculty, University of Sydney, for providing a grant to support research 
for this article; Helen Donovan, who provided valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article; and to 
anonymous reviewers for very helpful suggestions.  All translations, including of laws and court transcripts, 
are my own. 
1
 ROBERT W. HEFNER, CIVIL ISLAM: MUSLIMS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN INDONESIA 6 (2000). 
2
 See LUTHFI ASSYAUKANIE, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE IN INDONESIA 35 (2009) (a recent 
convincing attempt to define models of polity which various Muslim groups have sought).  
3
 Mark Cammack, Lawrence A. Young & Tim Heaton, Legislating Social Change in an Islamic 
Society-Indonesia's Marriage Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 45, 53 (1996).  I use “state” and “government” 
synonymously to refer to the national-level central (pusat) executive and legislature.  Although I refer to 
this entity as though it is homogenous, I am, of course, generalising.  Reflecting, at least in part, the 
diversity of Islamic thought, many state actors—legislative or executive—do not agree with the state’s 
overall handling of Islam, but this article presumes that it is possible to identify broad trends in the state’s 
approach to Islam.  I do not refer to the approach to Islam of the various levels of regional government, 
despite evidence that some of them are passing laws incorporating principles of Islamic law.  See Robin 
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This article identifies a new player in the contest between the state and 
Islam—the Constitutional Court.  Established in 2003, the Court has power 
to ensure that legislation enacted by Indonesia’s national parliament 
complies with the Indonesian Constitution.4  It is the first Indonesian court to 
have been granted these powers.  It has invalidated several statutes that 
contradict Indonesia’s constitutional Bill of Rights, inserted in 2000 during 
the second of four rounds of constitutional amendments made annually from 
1999 to 2002.5  
This article argues that the Court’s function puts it in a critical 
position as an arbiter between the central government and Islam, because the 
Constitution contains both Pancasila—Indonesia’s state ideology which 
requires a role for religion within the state—and provisions guaranteeing 
freedom of religion for citizens.  These include: 
 
1) Article 28E(1), which gives citizens freedom to “embrace a religion 
and to worship in accordance with that religion.” 
2) Article 29(2), which reaffirms Article 28E(1), stating that the “state is 
to guarantee the independence of every citizen to embrace their 
respective religion and to worship in accordance with that religion and 
belief.”  
3) Article 28I(1), which states that the right to religion, along with 
several other constitutional rights, “cannot be limited in any way.” 
 
These provisions raise key constitutional questions about the way the 
legal and political demands of more conservative Islam have been, and 
should be, handled by the state.  For many Muslims, Islam purports to 
provide a comprehensive set of rules—civil, criminal and public—for life.  
Does freedom of religion require that Muslims be subject to the corpus of 
Islamic law?  Does delineating the areas of Islamic law that the state will 
enforce and watering down some aspects of pure classical Islamic law 
contradict this freedom of religion?  
                                                                                                                              
Bush, One Step Forward, INSIDE INDONESIA, http://www.insideindonesia.org/content/view/12/29/ (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2010); see also Arskal Salim, Muslim Politics in Indonesia's Democratisation: The 
Religious Majority and the Rights of Minorities in the Post-New Order Era, in INDONESIA: DEMOCRACY 
AND THE PROMISE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 115 (Ross H. McLeod & Andrew J. MacIntyre eds., 2007) 
[hereinafter Salim, Muslim Politics]. 
4
 Indonesian Constitution, Articles 24C(1) and 24C(2).  The Court was established by Law No. 24 
of 2003 on the Constitutional Court. 
5
 See Tim Lindsey, Indonesian Constitutional Reform: Muddling Towards Democracy, 6 SING. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 244 (2002). 
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This article discusses two cases in which the Constitutional Court was 
asked to answer these very questions.  In the first, the Polygamy Case 
(2007),6 the applicant argued that the 1974 Marriage Law,7 which prohibits 
men from entering into a polygamous marriage without prior approval from 
a religious court, does not accord with Islamic law and hence intrudes upon 
his freedom of religion.  In the second, the Religious Courts Law Case 
(2008),8 the applicant claimed that the state-imposed limitation of the 
jurisdiction of religious courts to particular civil matters is unconstitutional 
because it prevented his full observance of Islam.  In both cases, 
Constitutional Court judges unanimously rejected these arguments, thereby 
supporting the gist of the central government’s approach towards Islamic 
law to date.  
Describing the relationship between Islam on the one hand and the 
Indonesian state on the other as a “contest” requires qualification.  Modern 
Indonesian Islamic thought and practice is radically diverse.9  It certainly 
does not comprise objectively identifiable and agreed-upon norms.  At the 
more conservative end of the spectrum are groups striving for state-
supported enforcement of uncodified and unreconstructed classical Islamic 
law (Syariah), as embodied in its traditional sources: the Quran, the sayings 
and deeds of the Prophet (Sunnah) and the rules contained in legal texts 
written by Islamic scholars (fiqh).10  Significant disagreement exists even 
amongst this group as to which of these sources should be taken as 
authoritative and how they should be interpreted and applied in Indonesia 
today. 
This article focuses on the response of the Indonesian state to 
demands of some of these more conservative groups for a greater role for 
Islamic law—a role which, according to their various interpretations, 
Syariah requires.  It must be emphasized, however, that most Indonesian 
Muslims accept interpretations of Islamic law that are “read in light of 
rapidly evolving social, economic and political contexts.”11  Many Muslims 
who accept less conservative interpretations are likely to be content with, or 
                                           
6
 See In re M Insa, No. 12/PUU-V/2007 (Constitutional Court case reviewing Law No. 1 of 1974 on 
Marriage), available at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/ [hereinafter Polygamy Case]. 
7
 Marriage Law No. 1, 1974 (Perkawinan). 
8
 See In re Suryani, No. 19/PUU-VI/2008, available at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/ 
[hereinafter Religious Courts Case] (Constitutional Court decision reviewing Law No. 7 of 1989 on the 
Religious Courts as amended by Law No. 3 of 2006 on Amendments to Law No. 7 of 1989 on the 
Religious Courts). 
9
 See R. MICHAEL FEENER, MUSLIM LEGAL THOUGHT IN MODERN INDONESIA xvii (2007). 
10
 Other commonly used spellings in the Indonesian context include Syariat, Syaria, Qu’ran and 
Koran. 
11
 FEENER, supra note 9, at xx. 
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may even actively encourage, the state’s treatment of Islam discussed in this 
article.  Rather than being considered secularist or anti-Islamic, it might be 
more accurate to claim that the state’s approach to Islam resembles some of 
these more progressive interpretations.  
II. ISLAM AND THE STATE IN INDONESIA: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND 
POLITICAL CONTEST 
By way of historical and political background to these cases, this 
article begins by discussing key “battles” in the contest between Islam and 
the state in modern Indonesia.  From the very first days of Indonesia’s 
independence, declared on August 17, 1945, the Indonesian state has limited 
the formal position of Islamic law within the national legal system.  It has 
sought to confine and neutralise Islam as a source of legal obligations and 
legal authority independent of, and perhaps even in competition with, the 
state.  
A. The Jakarta Charter and Pancasila  
In the lead-up to the declaration of independence, Muslim activists 
had successfully lobbied for the inclusion of the so-called “Jakarta Charter” 
(Piagam Jakarta) in the final draft of Indonesia’s first independent 
Constitution.  This charter required Muslims to follow Islamic law.  The 
charter was, however, quietly dropped from the final version of the 
Constitution of 1945.  It was removed to placate non-Muslim groups—
including Christians in Eastern Indonesia—who threatened to break away 
even before the state was formally established if the charter was retained, 
and to allay concerns about the wholesale imposition of Islamic law held by 
Indonesia’s more moderate Muslims, which are said to constitute a clear 
majority.12  The Charter’s rejection, however, was, and is still, seen by some 
Muslim groups as “the” great betrayal of Islam since independence.  
With the dropping of the charter, Indonesia did not, however, become 
an entirely secular state.  Pancasila—Indonesia’s state philosophy of five 
principles—was included in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution, partly to 
appease those who advocated in favour of the Jakarta Charter.  Pancasila has 
                                           
12
 See H MUHAMMAD YAMIN, NASKAH PERSIAPAN UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR 1945 (1959); see also 
FEENER, supra note 9; ARSKAL SALIM, CHALLENGING THE SECULAR STATE: THE ISLAMIZATION OF LAW IN 
MODERN INDONESIA 64-69 (2008). 
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as its first principle Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (Belief in a Unitary Deity).13  
Pancasila is the state philosophy and “the source of all sources of law,”14 
and, therefore, requires government and citizens alike to give effect to this 
principle.  The very founding principles of the state, therefore, appear to 
establish adherence to one’s religious beliefs as both a right and an 
obligation of Indonesian citizenship.  They also appear to compel the 
government to not only safeguard religious freedom but to utilise the 
machinery of the state to encourage and promote the exercise of faith, 
including Islam.  Because Pancasila mandates such a role for religion in 
matters of state, the ideological door has remained ajar for some Muslim 
groups to continue seeking a more prominent place for Islamic principles in 
government and law.  Furthermore, many Indonesian Muslims regard 
Islamic doctrine as having independent legal potency, regardless of its 
recognition, or lack thereof, by the state. 
Debates over the place of Islam within the Indonesian state, and calls 
for the reintroduction of the Jakarta Charter, have, therefore, continued since 
1945.  For example, Indonesia’s Constituent Assembly (Konstituante)—
established in the mid-1950s to devise a new Indonesian Constitution—was 
consumed with the issue.15  More recently, in 1999-2000, when Indonesia’s 
People’s Consultative Council was deliberating proposed amendments to the 
1945 Constitution, some Muslim members pushed, again unsuccessfully, for 
the entrenchment of provisions resembling the Jakarta Charter.16 
B. The Administration of Islamic Law: Accommodation and 
Incorporation 
While the Indonesian government has managed to deflect calls for the 
introduction of the Jakarta Charter and for an Islamic state, it has, however, 
allocated some space to Islamic law within the Indonesian legal and 
administrative systems.  The government administers aspects of Islam 
                                           
13
 The remaining four principles of Pancasila are: Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab (A Just and 
Civilised Humanity); Persatuan Indonesia (The Unity of Indonesia); Demokrasi; and Keadilan Sosial 
(Social Justice). 
14
 Lawmaking Law No. 10 2004, art. 2; Sunaryati Hartono, Sources of Law, in ASEAN LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 23 (1995); R DAMAN, HUKUM TATA NEGARA: SUATU PENGANTAR 141 (1993). 
15
 DANIEL S. LEV, THE TRANSITION TO GUIDED DEMOCRACY: INDONESIAN POLITICS, 1957-1959 257-
77 (1966); ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION, THE ASPIRATION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 
INDONESIA: A SOCIO-LEGAL STUDY OF THE INDONESIAN KONSTITUANTE 1956-1959 (1992).  Then-
President Soekarno unilaterally dissolved the Konstituante, along with the national parliament, before the 
debate could be concluded, thereby ushering in his period of “Guided Democracy,” under which Indonesia 
returned to the 1945 Constitution. 
16
 See NADIRSYAH HOSEN, SHARI'A & CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN INDONESIA 59 (2007); see also 
SALIM, supra note 12, at 87-111. 
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through the Ministry of Religious Affairs.17  The national legislature and 
executive have also enacted laws, applicable only to Muslims, which 
explicitly purport to incorporate Islamic legal norms into national law.  They 
have also passed laws which, while not making direct reference to Islam, 
appear to adopt concepts or principles widely associated with more 
conservative varieties of Islam.  
The substance of the former category of laws is primarily matters over 
which Indonesia’s religious courts (peradilan agama) have jurisdiction, 
including family, inheritance, and Islamic finance.18  These laws include the 
Compilation of Islamic Law (Presidential Decision No. 1 of 1999, herein 
referred to as the Kompilasi) and recently-enacted statutes on Islamic 
finance, including Law No. 21 of 2008 on Syariah Banking and Law No. 19 
of 2008 on Syariah Securities.  The limitation of the religious courts’ 
jurisdiction to several fields of Islamic law was disputed in a Constitutional 
Court case, discussed below.  
As to the latter category of laws, which appear to adopt, albeit not 
explicitly, Islamic norms, the most controversial has been the Anti-
Pornography Law (Law No. 44 of 2008), enacted in November 2008, which 
is said to reflect, albeit not explicitly, Islamic concepts of morality.19  Other 
examples include laws enacted by some of Indonesia’s local governments.20 
                                           
17
 See Ministry of Religious Affairs website, http://www.depag.go.id/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).  
The Ministry administers other religions, but the bulk of its work relates to the administration of Islam.  
18
 Despite being called “religious courts,” the peradilan agama are, in fact, more properly called 
Islamic courts because they hear only disputes between Muslims, applying laws purported to be based on 
Islam. 
19
 See Jason Tedjasukmana, Indonesia's New Anti-Porn Agenda, TIME, Nov. 6, 2008, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1857090,00.html; see also Geoff Thompson, Indonesia 
Passes Tough New Anti-Porn Laws, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP., Oct. 31, 2008, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/10/31/2406371.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010); see also Bush, 
supra note 3. 
20
 For reasons of space, this article does not consider these co-called “Syariah by-laws,” which have 
been discussed elsewhere.  See Jane Perlez, Spread of Islamic Law in Indonesia Takes Toll on Women, 
N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/world/asia/27iht-web.0627islam.2061807.html (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2010); see also Bush, supra note 3; see also Salim, Muslim Politics, supra note 3.  Other 
national-level laws appear to be pro-Islam, but cannot necessarily be said to incorporate aspects of Islamic 
law.  In 2003, a new National Education Law was enacted which requires students of primary and 
secondary schools to “receive education in accordance with their religion, taught by someone of that 
religion.”  Simon Butt, Polygamy and Mixed Marriage in Indonesia: Islam and the Marriage Law in the 
Courts, in INDONESIA: LAW AND SOCIETY 283 (Tim Lindsey ed., 2d ed. 2008).  This might not appear 
particularly controversial until one considers that very few non-Muslims attend Muslims schools, but many 
Muslims attend non-Muslim schools.  Christian schools might, therefore, be required to teach Islam, to hire 
Muslim teachers and perhaps even to provide a prayer room for their students.  Id. at 283.  In June 2008, 
the Religious Affairs and Internal Affairs Ministers and the Attorney General issued a Joint Decree 
“freezing” the activities of Ahmadiyah, a sect which aligns itself with Islam.  Ahmadiyah is denounced by 
many Muslims largely because the sect teaches that the Prophet Mohammad was not the last Prophet.  The 
Decree, however, seems to contradict the constitutional religious freedom provisions, set out below.  This 
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These administrative and legal accommodations offer far less to Islam 
than might be immediately apparent, for several reasons, some of which this 
article explores.  First, the Indonesian government has confined the 
operation of Islamic law to certain narrow fields which exclude public and 
criminal law.  Second, the state has ensured that those laws which purport to 
give effect to Islamic norms adopt less conservative interpretations of 
Islamic law.  In marriage law, for example, as discussed below, under the 
Kompilasi, polygamy is permissible only in very limited circumstances and 
even then only with the prior approval of a religious court.  Third, by taking 
control over the recruitment, training and employment of those bureaucrats 
and judges responsible for enforcing Islamic law, the state has been able to 
ensure that these actors give predominance to state law in their policy and 
decision-making, rather than giving effect to their own understandings of 
Islamic doctrine.  Fourth, and most significantly, the state has denied 
Syariah direct and independent authority as a source of law by passing laws 
that purport to comprehensively encapsulate and codify Syariah for the 
Indonesian context.  By so doing, the state has replaced Syariah’s divine 
authority with statutory authority, over which, of course, the state’s control is 
absolute.  
C. A “New” Reception Theory? 
The Indonesian state’s attempts to restrict state recognition of Islamic 
law to limited areas of law and to deny Islam independent legal authority 
resembles the so-called “reception theory” introduced by the Dutch during 
their colonisation of Indonesia.21  Indeed, Azra and Salim refer to the 
national government’s approach as the “new reception theory.”22  Until the 
late nineteenth century, Dutch colonists had presumed that Indonesian law 
was largely Islamic; that is, that most parts of Indonesia had adopted Islamic 
law in its entirety, thereby displacing pre-existing customary law (adat),23 
under which Indonesians had governed themselves before the coming of 
Islam.  This view was, however, displaced around the turn of the twentieth 
                                                                                                                              
Decree is widely considered to have been pushed by most conservative Islamic groups.  INTERNATIONAL 
CRISIS GROUP, INDONESIA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE AHMADIYAH DECREE (2008), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5556 (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
21
 M.B. Hooker, Introduction: Islamic Law in South-East Asia, 4 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 213, 218 
(2002). 
22
 Arskal Salim & Azyumardi Azra, Introduction: The State and Shari’a in the Perspective of 
Indonesian Legal Politics, in SHARI'A AND POLITICS IN MODERN INDONESIA 1, 13 (Arskal Salim & 
Azyumardi Azra eds., 2003). 
23
 DANIEL S. LEV, ISLAMIC COURTS IN INDONESIA: A STUDY IN THE POLITICAL BASES OF LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS 9 (1973). 
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century.  Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, a Dutch expert on Islam and Aceh, 
and an adviser to the colonial government, observed that “natives” did not 
use pure Islamic law to govern their lives, even in matters of marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance; rather, they primarily used adat.24  Islamic law, he 
contended, was practiced only to the extent that it had been absorbed into 
adat, and even then, adat had “moderated” Islamic law, syncretising it with 
pre-existing practices.25  Accepting this advice, the Dutch administration 
recognised and enforced principles of Islamic law, largely through a body of 
Islamic courts, only to the extent that those principles were reflected in 
adat.26  This policy attributed Syariah no formal recognition or status.27  
The reception theory should be viewed as part of Hurgronje’s concern 
to limit the potential public sphere of Islam.  He had advocated that within 
the colony, the practice of Islam should be divided into spiritual and political 
spheres.  He proposed that the Dutch should be neutral and tolerant towards 
religious observance, but vigilant in suppressing political aspirations of 
Islam—by force, if necessary.28  This, he argued, would reduce Indonesian 
resistance, often under the banner of Islam, to Dutch rule.29  Of course, this 
was an affront to Islam, under which there is no formal separation of religion 
and state.30 
Although both the Dutch and the new reception theories might have 
led to the same result—the subordination of Islamic law—they differ in 
important respects.  In the reception theory, the Dutch found a ready-made 
justification to avoid giving Islamic law independent legal authority.  
Although calculated to reduce opposition, it was in essence a passive 
                                           
24
 Harry J. Benda, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in 
Indonesia, in READINGS ON ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 61, 63 (Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon. Siddique, & 
Yasmin Hussain eds., 1985). 
25
 Id.; see Mohammad Daud Ali, The Position of Islamic Law in the Indonesian Legal System, in 
ISLAM AND SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 187, 193 (Taufik Abdullah & Sharon Siddique eds., 1986).  
26
 JOHN R. BOWEN, ISLAM, LAW, AND EQUALITY IN INDONESIA: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF PUBLIC 
REASONING 48-49 (2003); B. J. BOLAND, THE STRUGGLE OF ISLAM IN MODERN INDONESIA (1971); LEV, 
supra note 23; M. Irfan Idris, Konstitusionalisasi hukum Islam dalam hukum nasional, 3 Jurnal Konstitusi 
139-51, 143-44 (2006); Moch. Nur Ichwan, The Politics of Shari’atization: Central Governmental and 
Regional Discourses of Shari’a Implementation in Aceh, in ISLAMIC LAW IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA: 
IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS 193 (R. Michael Feener & Mark E. Cammack eds., 2007). 
27
 Hooker, supra note 21; M. B. HOOKER, ISLAMIC LAW IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 248 (1984).  The 
reception theory’s “selecting out” of Syariah from the formal legal system led some Indonesian Islamic 
scholars, notably Professor Hazairin of the University of Indonesia, to refer to it later as the teori iblis 
(devil’s theory) because it allowed non-Muslim sources of law to be placed above divine law, revealed by 
God.  M.B. HOOKER, INDONESIAN SYARIAH: DEFINING A NATIONAL SCHOOL OF ISLAMIC LAW 3 (2008). 
28
 HARRY J. BENDA, THE CRESCENT AND THE RISING SUN: INDONESIAN ISLAM UNDER THE JAPANESE 
OCCUPATION, 1942-1945 23-24 (1958). 
29
 Id.  
30
 See BOLAND, supra note 26, at 13-14. 
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approach giving effect to what the Dutch claimed was the status quo.  The 
independent state, on the other hand, needed to be rather proactive and 
responsive in the face of calls for it to accommodate a greater role for Islam 
within the state.  
III. THE POLYGAMY CASE (2007) 
Polygamy in Indonesia is, as elsewhere, contentious—condemned by 
some as discriminatory against women, and defended with great conviction 
by others as a practice explicitly sanctioned by Islamic law.31  To provide 
context to the Polygamy Case, I will discuss the Indonesian state’s attempts 
to regulate polygamy and some of the resistance it has faced, and continues 
to face, even from within its own judiciary. 
A. Polygamy Reform and Resistance: The Marriage Law and Kompilasi  
In 1973, the central government, then under the authoritarian rule of 
Soeharto, introduced a Draft Marriage Law that caused great concern 
amongst Indonesia’s more conservative Muslims.  The bill proposed to 
prohibit polygamy and unilateral divorce, both regarded by many Muslims 
as permissible under Islamic law.  The bill also sought to transfer to the 
general courts jurisdiction over all marriage issues—including Islamic 
marriage and divorce, which up to that point had been the core of religious 
court work.  This was seen as a serious symbolic and practical threat to 
Islamic law in Indonesia.  Left with jurisdiction over very few matters, the 
religious courts—the only institution of state that could apply Islamic law 
with executorial force—may have withered into insignificance.32  The 
central government was said to have several motives to enact the bill.  These 
included improving the legal status of women in marriage and reducing 
Islam’s potential as a source of political and legal authority competing with 
that of the state.33  
                                           
31
 “Polygamy,” in everyday parlance, is often used to indicate the practice of a man taking multiple 
wives.  In fact, however, it means having more than one spouse and can, therefore, refer to the practice of a 
woman taking multiple husbands.  Polygyny—being married to more than one wife—is the correct term.  
This article, however, continues to use “polygamy” not least because it is the term used by the 
Constitutional Court in the Polygamy Case (2007). 
32
 LEV, supra note 23; see Anthony H. Johns, Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism, in ISLAM IN 
ASIA: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 202 (John L. Esposito ed., 1987). 
33
 June S. Katz & Ronald S. Katz, The New Indonesian Marriage Law: A Mirror of Indonesia's 
Political, Cultural, and Legal Systems, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 653 (1975); June S. Katz & Ronald S. Katz, 
Legislating Social Change in a Developing Country: The New Indonesian Marriage Law Revisited, 26 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 309 (1978); Cammack, Young, & Heaton, supra note 3; Mark Cammack, Islamic Law in 
Indonesia's New Order, 38 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 53 (1989); Butt, supra note 20. 
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In the face of widespread protest from Muslim groups, the 
government significantly amended the bill.  The Marriage Law, as enacted in 
1974, preserves the religious courts’ jurisdiction to decide marriage law 
disputes between Muslims.  The Law declares that marriages will be valid if 
performed in accordance with the religious law of the parties, presumably 
meaning that the various religious laws and customs governing marriages in 
Indonesia, including Islamic marriage law, continue “as is,” provided that 
they are consistent with the Marriage Law.34 
In this regard, the Marriage Law did not do away entirely with 
polygamy.  It did, however, make entering into a valid state-recognised 
polygamous marriage legally difficult.  It requires a man who wishes to 
marry polygamously to first obtain consent from a religious court.  Article 4 
of the Marriage Law declares that judicial permission is not to be granted 
unless:   
 
1) the man’s current wife or wives have agreed to the marriage; 
2) he guarantees to, and can in fact, provide the necessities of life for his 
wives and their children; and 
3) he can and will act justly towards his wives and children.35 
 
In addition, the man’s current wife or wives must: 
 
1) be unable to perform her duties as a wife; 
2) suffer from physical defects or an incurable illness; or 
3) be unable to bear children.36 
 
A polygamous marriage concluded without judicial consent is considered to 
have never taken place, leaving the man open to fines and imprisonment 
under the Indonesian Criminal Code.37 
Research conducted soon after the passage of the Marriage Law 
showed, however, that many religious court judges ignored the government’s 
attempt to restrict polygamy, resolute that the state lacked authority to 
                                           
34
 Undang-Undang No. 3019, Th. 1974 Tentang Perkawinan, art. 2(1), [Law No. 3019, Year 1974 on 
Marriage] (Jan. 2, 1974) [hereinafter Marriage Law]; see, e.g., id. art 7(1) (setting the minimum age for 
marriage at nineteen for males and sixteen for females, and breach of this provision will render the 
marriage invalid, regardless of the religions of the parties). 
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interfere with Islamic law.38  These judges were said to allow polygamous 
marriage without determining whether the Marriage Law’s requirements had 
been met.  
The Soeharto government responded to this perceived recalcitrance by 
bringing the religious courts, and their judges, more squarely under its 
control.  First, from the late 1970s, religious court decisions were made 
subject to judicial “supervision” by the Supreme Court through the formal 
appeals process.39  The Supreme Court could, therefore, overturn decisions 
of religious courts which ignored the Marriage Law.  This was said to have 
increased compliance with the Marriage Law because religious court judges 
feared reversal on appeal if they did not frame their decisions with reference 
to the state law.  Second, the procedures for recruiting and training religious 
court judges were overhauled.  Prior to 1989, religious court judges had been 
part-time locals, recruited largely on the basis of their Islamic credentials —
particularly their ability to read Arabic and their knowledge of key fiqh 
literature.  Under the 1989 Religious Courts Law,40 they are now employed 
as full-time career judges, regularly transferred to other religious courts 
around the archipelago, and required to undergo academic training, 
including training in secular law.41  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the government produced 
within the Kompilasi codified Islamic law doctrine on marriage, inheritance, 
and gifts, casting the Kompilasi as a comprehensive guide for religious court 
judges to use in their cases.42  The Kompilasi, assembled by the Supreme 
Court and the Religious Affairs Ministry, is said to be the product of 
extensive consideration of thirty-eight fiqh texts, interviews with 166 ulama 
and comparative studies of the Islamic law applied in Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Morocco.43  It adds very little to the Marriage Law on the issue of polygamy.  
However, unlike the Marriage Law—which does not set out Islamic 
marriage law principles and which applies to all citizens regardless of their 
religion or beliefs—the Kompilasi purports to contain the Islamic law on 
marriage that Indonesian religious courts should apply.44  Before the 
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issuance of the Kompilasi, religious court judges could apply their own 
particular understanding of Islamic doctrine governing marriage by pointing 
to Article 2(1) of the Marriage Law, which provides that marriage is valid if 
performed in accordance with the parties’ religious laws.  However, since the 
issuance of the Kompilasi, religious court judges should refer exclusively to 
the Kompilasi.  
The Kompilasi offers two important benefits for the state.  First, the 
Kompilasi’s restrictions on polygamy are implicitly cast as being imposed by 
Islamic law, not by the state, as with the Marriage Law.  Against claims that 
the government breaches Islamic law by limiting the circumstances in which 
polygamy is permitted, the government can point to the Kompilasi, claiming 
that it is a world-standard compilation of Islamic law devised by experts and 
based on fiqh.  Second, the central government has denied sources of Islamic 
law, such as fiqh, direct legal authority; Islamic rules on marriage remain 
contingent upon their recognition by the state through the Kompilasi.  
B. The Kompilasi in Practice 
Soon after the Kompilasi’s enactment many religious court judges 
began referring almost exclusively to it, rather than fiqh, in their 
judgments.45  The result was that they were said to turn down most 
polygamous marriage requests, declaring that it was impossible to be fair 
and just to more than one wife.46  
The “secularization” of the Islamic judiciary and the Kompilasi has 
not, however, settled the contest over polygamy between Islam and the state.  
There is some evidence, albeit scant, that religious court judges have 
resumed endorsing polygamous marriages by primarily referring directly to 
Syariah sources rather than the Kompilasi or the Marriage Law.  From an 
examination of Surabaya religious court decisions from 2003-2005, Hooker 
observed that the court would generally permit a polygamous marriage if 
presented with three pieces of documentary evidence: 
  
1) a statement of income from the husband,  
2) a signed statement that he can provide for his current and future 
wives, and  
3) a written statement that the second wife was fully aware of potential 
problems and risks and promised to be kind to the first wife.47  
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This evidence is far less than the Marriage Law and the Kompilasi 
require.  If the Marriage Law were followed to its letter, the man must also 
produce evidence of his existing wife’s or wives’ inabilities to “perform her 
duties as a wife” or bear children, or “physical defects” or “incurable 
illness.”48  Nevertheless, the Surabaya courts would usually approve the 
marriage, declaring it necessary to prevent the husband from being tempted 
into extra-marital sex.  To justify this decision, the courts would often cite 
Chapter 4, verse 3 of the Quran: 
[M]arry women of your choice, two, or three, or four; but if you 
fear that you shall not be able to deal justly [with them]; then 
only one, or that which your right hands possess. That will be 
more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice.49 
Hooker warns that these cases should not be considered 
representative; they cannot be taken to indicate that all 300 or so of 
Indonesia’s religious courts have reverted to direct sources of Islamic law.50  
Estimates suggest, however, that religious courts across Indonesia were, at 
time of writing, approving a high proportion of applications for permission 
to marry polygamously.  According to Hukumonline, Indonesia’s leading 
source of legal news, 1,016 applications for permission to marry 
polygamously were lodged in religious courts in 2004, of which 800 were 
approved; in 2005, 186 were approved from 989 applications; and in 2006, 
776 were approved from 1,148.51  While this seems quite a small number 
given Indonesia’s population, the proportion of approvals may support 
claims of a return to a relatively permissive approach to polygamy.52 
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C. The Parties’ Arguments in the Polygamy Case (2007) 
The applicant, a man named M Insa, objected to provisions in the 
Marriage Law that he claimed prevented him from engaging in polygamy.  
He had gone to the Religious Affairs Office expecting to be able to marry 
polygamously, but officials rejected his request because he had not obtained 
judicial consent.  Dissatisfied, he applied to the Constitutional Court for a 
review of the Law.  
Insa argued before the Court that several aspects of the Marriage Law 
contradicted Islamic law, including: the provision in Article 3(1) declaring 
that marriages should be, in principle, monogamous; the various 
requirements that men must meet in order to obtain judicial consent for 
polygamy; and the invalidation of unapproved polygamous marriages.53 
In support of his claim, Insa made several non-constitutional 
arguments.  These included that restricting polygamy increased the divorce 
rate, adultery, and the tendency of widows to become sex workers.  The 
Constitutional Court dismissed these as unsubstantiated claims, pointing out 
that research had shown the contrary, and that, in fact, factors other than 
restrictions on polygamy were probably at play.54  
Insa’s two main constitutional arguments were as follows.  First, 
Article 28B(1) of the Constitution states that every person has the right to 
create a family and to continue their lineage through a valid marriage.  He 
claimed that restricting polygamy impeded the exercise of this right.  The 
Court rejected this argument, declaring that the Marriage Law did not 
prohibit Muslims from marrying.55  The Law even allowed them to marry 
polygamously—it merely imposed preconditions to ensure that the purposes 
of marriage were met.56  
Second, Article 28E(1) of the Constitution gives citizens freedom to 
embrace a religion and to worship in accordance with that religion.  Insa 
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argued that restricting polygamy was tantamount to breaching Islamic law.  
Below, I discuss the Court’s treatment of this second argument.  Before 
doing so, I turn to some of the arguments that the government put before the 
Court in support of the constitutionality of the Marriage Law.  
Included in the case file is an opening statement from Minister for 
Religious Affairs HM Maftuh Basuni.  He began by observing that Article 
28J(2) of the Constitution allows the state to impose limits on the human 
rights that the Constitution provides and that, even though the Constitution 
contains a right to marriage, it contains no right to polygamous marriage.57  
In any event, the Minister asserted, the Marriage Law does not prohibit 
polygamy.58 
The Minister then argued that in fact, Islam favoured monogamy over 
polygamy.  After referring to Chapter 4 verse 3 of the Quran, set out above, 
he cited Chapter 4 verse 129:  “You are never able to be fair and just as 
between women, even if it is your ardent desire; but turn not away (from a 
woman) altogether, so as to leave her hanging.  If you come to a friendly 
understanding, and practice self-restraint, God is Oft-forgiving, Most 
Merciful.” 
The Minister claimed, as have some Indonesian scholars,59 and 
scholars elsewhere,60 that 4:129 effectively prohibits polygamy altogether 
because it declares that being fair and just towards two or more wives is 
impossible.  Thus, contrary to Insa’s contention, Islamic law was therefore 
entirely consistent with the Marriage Law’s emphasis on monogamy.  
Further, the government claimed in a written statement submitted to 
the Court, that verse 4:3, viewed in its historical context, does not permit 
polygamy without qualification.  This reasoning, apparently based on the 
arguments of moderate scholars, is grounded in Quranic historical context.  
The provisions of the Quran relating to polygamy were revealed in the 
seventh century, soon after the Uhud war.  Many men were killed in the war, 
leaving multitudes of widows and fatherless children.  At that time, it 
seemed reasonable for the surviving men to support not only their own 
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wives and children, but also those of their fallen comrades.  Marriage was 
seen as one way to formalise this.61  Viewed in this context, the government 
contended that the Quranic provisions on polygamy aimed to ensure that 
men treated their “adopted” wives and orphans fairly—for example, by not 
misusing any money or inheritance they might have obtained when taking on 
the extra wives and children.62  After explaining this historical context, the 
government concluded that under Islam, “ . . . in theory and practice, 
polygamy is not something that must be done; rather it is a door used in 
emergencies.”63  
D. The Court’s Decision in the Polygamy Case (2007) 
Because the applicant had employed arguments based on Islamic law, 
the Constitutional Court announced that it would consider the Islamic 
teachings (ajaran Islam) on polygamy before addressing the 
constitutionality of the contested provisions of the Marriage Law.64 The 
Court began by setting out several verses of the Quran in Arabic, including 
4:3 and 4:129, with Religious Affairs Department-sanctioned Indonesian 
translation.  The Court pointed out, as had expert witnesses during case 
hearings, that when Islam was revealed through the Prophet Mohammad, 
polygamy had been widely practiced for centuries throughout the world.  
Polygamy was not, therefore, created by Islam.  On the contrary, in an effort 
to protect the dignity of women, Islam attemped to bring some gradual order 
(menertibkan) to polygamy by ensuring that polygamy did not occur 
arbitrarily on the whim of men.65 
Again referring to expert testimony heard during the hearings, the 
Court then discussed the purpose and nature of marriage using terminology 
from the Quran and adopted in the Kompilasi.  According to the Court, the 
purpose of marriage is to “make the heart peaceful (sakinah).”  This can be 
preserved if partners maintain mawaddah—that is, in the words of the Court, 
they “love one another without hoping for anything in return, but only 
because of their desires to make sacrifices by giving happiness to the other 
partner.”66  This statement strongly resembles Article 3 of the Kompilasi, 
which states that the purpose of marriage is to “create a home which is 
sakinah, mawaddah and friendly (rahmah).”  Without mentioning the 
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Kompilasi, the Court declared that maintaining mawaddah and sakinah 
underlie the requirement under Islamic law that men seek permission from 
existing wives before entering into another marriage.67   
The Court then announced that most ulama (Islamic scholars) agree 
that polygamy is mubah (neither “good” nor “bad”) or halal (permitted) 
under Islamic Law, provided that the man meets various conditions, which 
broadly correspond with those imposed in the Marriage Law.  These include, 
being just to one’s wives and sharing (al-qisth)—that is, providing for 
existing wives, prospective wives, existing children and future children that 
come from the polygamous marriage.68  If the man cannot satisfy these 
requirements, then according to the ulama polygamy can become makruh 
(objectionable, but not prohibited) under Islamic law.  Whether these 
requirements have been met depends on the particular circumstances of the 
parties—matters that, according to the ulama, can legitimately be 
determined by statute and through courts.69  The Court continued: 
[T]he state, as the highest organization in a community, created 
on the basis of agreement, does not only have the authority to 
regulate (bevoeg te regel) but also the obligation to regulate, 
(verplicht te regel) to guarantee the realization of justice, 
through laws that fall within its jurisdiction and which are 
upheld through the courts. This accords with the fiqh cited by 
the expert Prof. Dr. Hj. Huzaemah T. Yanggo . . . . The state 
(ulil amri) has the authority to determine the requirements 
which must be fulfilled by citizens who wish to enter into a 
polygamous marriage in the interests of the public benefit, 
particularly to achieve the goals of marriage—that is, to create a 
happy and everlasting family (household) based on the 
Almighty God, which is identical to the meaning of a family 
which is sakinah, as set out above.70 
Finally, the Constitutional Court pointed out that, according to Islamic law, 
polygamy is something that humans can regulate, at least to some extent.  
The Court distinguished between acts of devotion or worship of God 
(ibadah) and relations between humans (mu’amalah).  Ibadah are, the Court 
stated, covered in some detail in the Quran and considered immutable.  
Humans are not permitted to interfere with ibadah.  On the other hand, the 
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Quran refers to mu’amalah in less detail, leaving its regulation largely to 
humans.71   Polygamy does not fall into the category of ibadah, the Court 
observed, so Islam does not prohibit the state from imposing preconditions 
upon its exercise.72  
IV. THE RELIGIOUS COURTS LAW CASE (2008)73 
In this case, the constitutionality of Article 49(1) of the Religious 
Courts Law was challenged.  Article 49(1) sets out the matters over which 
Indonesia’s religious courts have jurisdiction.74  The religious courts have 
the duty and authority to investigate, decide and resolve cases at first 
instance between Muslims in matters of:  
 
a) marriage (Perkawinan) 
b) succession (Waris) 
c) gifts (Hibah) 
d) bequeaths (Wakaf) 
e) payment of alms (Zakat)  
f) charitable gifts (Infaq)  
g) gifts to the needy (Shadaqah) 
h) Syariah economic matters (Ekonomi syari’ah). 
 
The applicant, a young Islamic school (Madrasah) graduate from 
Serang, Banten, argued that Islam required Muslims to abide by Islamic law 
in its entirety, and not merely those areas of law listed in Article 49(1).  
Adherence to Islam requires Muslims to be subject to Islamic criminal law, 
including the penalty of hand amputation for theft, he claimed.75  The 
applicant argued that by limiting the matters of Islamic law that religious 
courts could apply and enforce, Article 49(1) breached the constitutional 
rights to religious freedom of the applicant and the entire Indonesian Muslim 
community.76  
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A. The Court’s Decision in the Religious Courts Law Case (2008) 
This case was ultimately decided on grounds unrelated to Islam.  The 
Court declared that the applicant had asked it for a result it could not 
provide—namely, to add to the jurisdiction of the religious courts and to 
invalidate Article 49(1).  The Court declared that it lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain the former request.  The Court stated it was merely a “negative 
legislature”—it has power only to invalidate legislation that it finds to be 
inconsistent with the Constitution.  It was not a “positive legislator.”  Only 
the elected national legislature could add to, or otherwise amend, 
legislation.77 
As for the second request, the Court held that the constitutional basis 
for Article 49(1) was entirely sound.  The Court pointed to Articles 24(2) 
and 24A(5) of the Constitution, which formally establish the religious courts 
as a branch of the Indonesian judiciary and state that their jurisdiction is to 
be “stipulated by legislation.”78  Because the Constitution gives the 
legislature unbridled discretion to determine the religious courts’ 
jurisdiction, provided that it does so by statute, Article 49(1), therefore, fell 
well within the national parliament’s legislative powers granted by the 
Constitution.  In any event, as one Constitutional Court Justice Muhammad 
Alim observed during one of the case hearings, a finding of invalidity could 
hardly have been in the applicant’s best interests.  If the Court found that 
Article 49(1) was invalid, then revoking it would leave the religious courts 
with no jurisdiction at all, and hence no function.79  
Arguably, these responses were sufficient to defeat the application.  
Nevertheless, answering the applicant’s argument that the Indonesian state 
had a constitutional obligation to apply and enforce the religious laws of its 
citizens, the Court declared:  
[T]he Court is of the opinion that the Applicant’s argument does 
not accord with the understanding of the relationship between 
religion and the state [in Indonesia].  Indonesia is not a 
religious state which is based only on one religion; but 
Indonesia is also not a secular state which does not consider 
religion at all.  It does not hand over all religious affairs entirely 
to individuals and the community.  Indonesia is a state which is 
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based on the Almighty God.  The state protects [the right of] all 
religious adherents to carry out the teachings of their respective 
religions.  In relation to the philosophy of Pancasila, national 
law must guarantee the integrity of the ideology and the 
integration of the nation, and develop religious tolerance based 
on justice and civility.  National law, therefore, can be an 
integrating factor which is a glue and unifier of the nation.  The 
state’s service to citizens does not depend on whether adherents 
to a particular religion, ethnic group or race are in the majority 
or minority.  If the issue [in contention is whether] Islamic law 
is . . . a source of law, it can be said that Islamic law is indeed a 
source of national law.  But it is not the only source of national 
law, because in addition to Islamic law, customary law, western 
law and other sources of legal tradition are sources of national 
law.  Therefore, Islamic law can be one of the sources of 
material for law as part of formal government laws.  Islamic 
law, as a source of law, can be used together with other sources 
of law, and, in this way, can be the material for the creation of 
government laws which are in force as national law.80 
A more direct statement made by Constitutional Court Justice Muhammad 
Alim during case hearings about the position of Islam within the state is also 
worthy of note:   
[Y]ou must understand that in this Republic of Indonesia, the 
highest law is the 1945 Constitution, not the Quran.  As 
Muslims, we consider the Quran to be the highest law but 
 . . . the national consensus is that the Constitution is the highest 
law.81 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Indonesian state’s attempts to limit the public space it allocates to 
Islamic law continue to be contested, including now in Indonesia’s 
Constitutional Court.  In the Religious Courts Case, the Constitutional Court 
has acknowledged the inherent conflict between the authority of the state 
and Islam, but has resolved the conflict in favour of the state.  The Court 
adopted an approach that, for the most part, is consistent with that taken by 
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the national legislature and executive: Islamic law is not formally applicable 
or enforced, except for the fields over which the religious courts have 
jurisdiction, which include marriage, divorce, inheritance, trusts, gifts, and 
Islamic finance.  Importantly, the traditional texts of Islamic law are not the 
direct sources of the rules to be applied.  
In the Polygamy Case, the Court sought to justify the government’s 
restriction of unbridled polygamy by reference to Islamic law, including the 
Quran.  The Constitutional Court’s approach resembles the state’s strategy 
adopted through the issuance of the Kompilasi.  The Kompilasi did not 
merely set out the parameters for the operation of Islamic law.  It did not, for 
example, declare simply that the Islamic courts should apply Islamic family 
law as propounded by a particular school of Islamic law.  Rather, the 
Kompilasi set out, exhaustively, the principles of Islamic law that the state 
recognises and enforces.  The very act of “engaging” with Islamic law and 
purporting to compile it into a law of the state denied traditional sources of 
Islamic law independent potency.  Furthermore, despite its ruling in the 
Religious Courts Case, the Constitutional Court in the Polygamy Case was 
not content to declare merely that state law trumps Islamic law. Rather, it 
“engaged” with arguments on Islamic law, declaring, for example, that 
Islamic law was not entirely permissive of polygamy and permitted the state 
to play a role in non-ibadah matters such as these.82  The Court eschewed 
conservative interpretations of Islam permitting polygamy, and embraced the 
more moderate and inclusive interpretations of Islamic law generally 
favoured by the state and many Indonesian Muslims.  By incorporating such 
a discussion within its decision the Court has solidified both the state’s 
predominance over Islam and the preferred interpretations of Islam by the 
state and less conservative Muslim groups.  
For now, the Court appears to have closed itself off as a site of contest 
between the semi-secular state and Islam, at least over the constitutional 
right to freedom of religion.  In this author’s view, the treatment of Islam by 
the state and the Constitutional Court is defendable for practical and 
democratic reasons.  Some commentators have signaled the so-called 
“santrification” of Indonesia—that is, an increase in outward support for 
conservative Islam, accompanied by support for literal interpretations of the 
traditional sources of Islamic law.83  And, particularly since the 1990s, the 
rise of radical and sectarian tendencies has consumed much of the 
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scholarship and commentary on Indonesian Islam. This attention can be 
attributed, at least in part, to the outbreak of unrest between Muslim and 
Christian groups in East Indonesia and increasing terrorism, including raids 
by paramilitary groups such as the Islamic Defenders’ Front.84  Many 
scholars, however, agree that a large majority of Indonesian Muslims are 
moderate and tolerant.85  Although holding a strong sense of Islamic identity 
and ritually oberving the five pillars of Islam, these Muslims also accept the 
multitude of local spiritual observances not necessarily inspired by Islam.86  
Most Indonesians, therefore, are unlikely to favour a “classic” or 
“rigid” version of Islamic law, nor the expansion of the fields of Islamic law 
enforced by the state.87  Thus, there is arguably little public and political 
support for a greater role for Islam outside of the private sphere.  This seems 
to be borne out in the lack of parliamentary representation for political 
Islam.  Although Islamic parties hold seats in Indonesia’s national 
parliament, the majority parties are not associated with Islam and most of the 
so-called Islamic parties are associated with moderate Islamic organisations.   
While some smaller Islam-based parties might be vocal in their calls 
for a greater role for Islam, it seems fair to conclude that they enjoy very 
little support in Indonesia’s legislature.  For example, proposals to insert a 
constitutional amendment resembling the Jakarta Charter in 1999-2002 were 
ultimately voted down by an overwhelming majority of Indonesia’s People’s 
Consultative Council.88  Islamic parties received only fourteen percent and 
seventeen percent of the vote in the 1999 and 2004 general elections 
respectively.89  Results of the 2009 general elections, in which the vote for 
parties associated with Islamic aspirations declined significantly, appear to 
lend support and currency to these observations.  
In this context, it may be that allocating a greater role for Islamic law 
within the Indonesian legal system would misrepresent the wishes of most 
Indonesian Muslims, who are more comfortable with a less conservative and 
more syncretic variety of Islamic law.  Indeed, for many Indonesian 
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Muslims, applying rules of “pure” Islamic law might involve the imposition 
of new rules.  Arguments along these lines were said to have inspired the 
famous Dutch adat law scholars van Vollenhoven and ter Haar,90 who agreed 
with Hurgronje that adat should be the primary source of law for indigenous 
Indonesians,91 though for different reasons than those that motivated the 
reception theory.  They argued that adat should predominate so as to reflect 
the legal realities of life in Indonesia, not to suppress the political potential 
of Islam.92  Perhaps then the “new” reception theory is a fair compromise 
between the state and conservative Islam and the Constitutional Court has 
reflected the desires of not only the state, but also of the majority of 
Indonesian Muslims.  
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